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US Shift in W. Asia<\/strong><\/p>\n \n By Shivaji Sarkar<\/strong><\/p>\n \n Rapid developments appear to be reshaping India\u2019s regional landscape, hinting at a subtle yet significant realignment of strategic interests. These shifts could mark the early stages of a new regional balance \u2014 one that may open fresh avenues for India and alter long-standing equations across Indo-Pacific, West and South Asia.<\/p>\n The U.S. decision to relax sanctions on Iran\u2019s Chabahar port for six months has revived India\u2019s long-stalled $370 million project, strengthening its role in regional logistics and security. Combined with a new 10-year defence pact with Washington, these moves point to a quiet reconfiguration of the Indo-Pacific and West and South Asian order on the sidelines of ASEAN defence ministers\u2019 meeting.<\/p>\n Together, these moves signal a recalibration of Washington\u2019s South Asia policy \u2014 one that appears to recognise India\u2019s pivotal role and extends cooperation well beyond trade or tariff disputes.<\/p>\n The significance of these developments cannot be overstated. The Chabahar relaxation comes at a time when the U.S.\u2013Taliban standoff over Bagram airbase remains unresolved and the global energy market is under stress from continuing instability in the Middle East. If these changes continue on their current trajectory, they could have lasting implications for the global strategic order \u2014 especially given the overlapping signals from Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump\u2019s Alaska dialogue, the Xi\u2013Trump trade understanding on tariffs and rare-earth supplies, and the quiet thaw between India and China on limited trade and security matters.<\/p>\n During the ASEAN meeting, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh remarked that India \u201cno longer remains China-focused,\u201d suggesting a broader approach to regional security. His statement came after talks with U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, where both sides reaffirmed a shared vision of peace, prosperity, and stability in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n \n Chabahar: A Strategic Pivot<\/p>\n The Chabahar Port project lies at the heart of this emerging realignment. For Washington, it provides a controlled avenue to support Afghanistan\u2019s reconstruction without strengthening Pakistan\u2019s leverage. For New Delhi, it is a crucial instrument to counter Chinese and Pakistani influence in the region. Strategically located almost opposite Pakistan\u2019s Chinese-built Gwadar Port, Chabahar offers India a rare geopolitical advantage.<\/p>\n The port\u2019s inclusion in the International North\u2013South Transport Corridor (INSTC) further boosts its relevance. It links India not only to Iran but also to Russia, Central Asia, and Europe via sea, rail, and road networks. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, both landlocked, have expressed interest in using Chabahar as their gateway to the Indian Ocean Region, reinforcing India\u2019s status as a logistics hub for Eurasian trade.<\/p>\n The Chabahar project, rooted in the 2016 India-Iran-Afghanistan Trilateral Agreement, gives India a vital overland route to Afghanistan\u2014symbolising strategic autonomy from China and Pakistan\u2019s regional hold. The U.S.\u2019s renewed six-month sanctions waiver, after its 2025 revocation, signals a calculated exception for India and hints at Washington\u2019s growing reliance on New Delhi as a regional intermediary, possibly even a bridge to the Taliban.<\/p>\n The U.S. had previously revoked the Chabahar waiver in September 2025, exposing Indian entities like India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) to potential sanctions under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA). The renewed relaxation, therefore, is both symbolic and strategic \u2014 an exception carved out for India amid an otherwise hostile U.S. policy toward Tehran.<\/p>\n Trade Ties and Economic Footprint<\/p>\n India\u2013Iran bilateral trade stood at $2.33 billion in 2022\u201323, marking a 21.76 percent year-on-year increase but still 23 percent below the previous year\u2019s volume. India exported $nz61.66 billion in agricultural and livestock products \u2014 including meat, dairy, onions, garlic, and canned vegetables \u2014 while importing $672 million in petrochemicals and food items such as methanol, bitumen, propane, butane, apples, dates, and almonds.<\/p>\n Trade with Afghanistan totalled around $1 billion in 2023\u201324, slightly down from $1.06 billion in 2021\u201322, with exports worth $ 355 million and imports about $ 672 million. Despite the Taliban\u2019s return, India has maintained limited humanitarian and commodity trade links through Iranian ports \u2014 a quiet continuity that has not gone unnoticed in Washington.<\/p>\n According to a U.S. State Department statement, the South Asia strategy \u201cunderscores our ongoing support for Afghanistan\u2019s economic growth and our close partnership with India.\u201d It further notes that Washington seeks to maintain maximum pressure on Iran\u2019s destabilising actions while encouraging regional development. Notably, Chabahar remains the only Iranian entity explicitly exempted from U.S. sanctions \u2014 an indicator of its unique place in American strategic calculations.<\/p>\n \n Defence and Trade Dimensions<\/p>\n Although not directly tied to Chabahar, the 10-year India\u2013U.S. Defence Pact represents a deeper phase of cooperation. The framework builds on the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) signed in 2024, which allows both countries to request priority delivery of defence materials from private suppliers in each other\u2019s markets.<\/p>\n In 2024, India\u2013U.S. trade of $118.2 billion, with India enjoying a $36.8 billion surplus \u2014 exporting $77.5 billion and importing $40.7 billion. However, the relationship remains textured: President Trump\u2019s imposition of 24 per cent reciprocal tariffs on Indian goods, followed by a 25 percent penalty over New Delhi\u2019s Russian defence purchases, reflects the persistent friction within an otherwise expanding partnership.<\/p>\n Still, the defence framework is expected to expedite the purchase of 113 GE jet engines for India\u2019s Tejas aircraft and open negotiations on other combat systems. Washington\u2019s willingness to accommodate New Delhi\u2019s broader geopolitical interests \u2014 even amid tariff tensions \u2014 suggests a recognition of India\u2019s value as a long-term strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n \n Regional Strategy and Outlook<\/p>\n Analysts see these moves as part of a broader U.S. recalibration in West and South Asia, where the search for reliable partners has grown urgent. The six-month sanction pause on Chabahar may not amount to a full policy reversal toward Iran, but it clearly indicates that Washington is ready to make selective exceptions for India when strategic imperatives demand flexibility.<\/p>\n In the long run, this could mark the beginning of a more pragmatic U.S. regional strategy \u2014 one that looks beyond its traditional alliances with Israel and Pakistan and acknowledges the complexity of a multipolar Asia. For India, the developments reaffirm its growing ability to engage simultaneously with the U.S., Russia, Iran, and China, maintaining autonomy amid global rivalries.<\/p>\n For now, any U.S.\u2013Iran rapprochement remains distant. Relations between the two remain at their lowest point in decades, clouded by deep mistrust, nuclear tensions, and the June 2025 military confrontations. Yet, both sides share overlapping interests \u2014 from ensuring Iran\u2019s stability to combating extremist networks \u2014 that could, over time, provide a basis for limited cooperation. \u2014 INFA<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" US Shift in W. Asia By Shivaji Sarkar Rapid developments appear to be reshaping India\u2019s regional landscape, hinting at a subtle yet significant realignment of strategic interests. These shifts could mark the early stages of a new regional balance \u2014 one that may open fresh avenues for India and alter long-standing equations across Indo-Pacific, West […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-273366","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-features"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/273366","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=273366"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/273366\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=273366"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=273366"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=273366"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}