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India’s West Path<\/strong><\/p>\n \n By Piotr Opalinski<\/strong><\/p>\n (Expert, Centre for International Relations, Poland)<\/strong><\/p>\n \n \n India\u2019s increased involvement in Afghanistan and its consistent pursuit of developing cooperation with Iran and Central Asian states are part of a broader strategy for balancing a geopolitical environment increasingly shaped by China\u2019s growing power. This pivot to the West is becoming a tool for overcoming asymmetries and a response to Chinese actions perceived as building a \u201cring\u201d or \u201cstring of pearls\u201d around India.<\/p>\n In recent years, Beijing has strengthened its influence in India\u2019s immediate vicinity: from Sri Lanka and Maldives to Bangladesh and Nepal. China\u2019s trade with Bangladesh reached $17\u201322 billion, its share of capital in Lanka\u2019s debt was 20%, and infrastructure investments in Nepal nearly doubled. Besides, Pakistan\u2019s increasingly close cooperation with China\u2014based on military and economic components, particularly related to development of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor \u2014increased strategic pressure on India to the west and north.<\/p>\n Delhi needs a strategic \u201csecond circle\u201d: a space that will make its trade routes independent from its neighbours, increase its logistical resilience, and hinder geopolitical encirclement. This logic is not new. The ancient concept of Raja mandala, described in the Arthashastra, envisaged building alliances beyond the immediate neighbourhood\u2014especially when neighbours are hostile.<\/p>\n Indian history has repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach: the Delhi Sultanate used alliances with the Deccan to counteract pressure from the north; and in 1970s, India turned to Soviet Union to balance the US and China influence. Today, Delhi is using this logic again. By intensifying its relations with Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, it seeks to build strategic depth and expand its maneuver space beyond the area where Sino-Pakistani pressure is most felt.<\/p>\n A key element of India\u2019s strategy to escape the continental \u201csqueeze\u201d is Chabahar Port, India\u2019s largest infrastructure investment outside its borders in years, and its significance extends far beyond logistics. The port integrates India with the International North-South Transport Corridor\u2014 a multimodal transport network connecting it with Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia, with branches reaching the Caucasus, Central Asia and Europe. Chabahar offers a viable alternative to routes through Pakistan, where tensions with Afghanistan and India significantly hamper goods\u2019 transit.<\/p>\n The project, however, is not without risks. These include tensions related to sanctions on Iran, Beijing\u2019s pressure on Tehran, and the uncertain situation in Afghanistan. Despite these challenges, Chabahar remains a structural investment\u2014one of the few projects changing the geopolitical map of Indo-Eurasia and serving as a key tool for stabilizing transport routes and establishing new channels of influence in the region.<\/p>\n A year after the US withdrew from Afghanistan, agreements granting India operational access to the Ayni and Farkhor air bases in Tajikistan expired, weakening its ability to project power in the region. In response, New Delhi intensified its functional diplomacy, maintaining working relationships, strengthening economic influence, and ensuring basic security conditions for investment.<\/p>\n The priority goal was to block the possibility of using Afghanistan both as a strategic depth for Pakistan and as a base of operations for terrorist groups operating against India. Since 2022, technical dialogue with Taliban has resulted in declarations of non-support for such groups. In parallel, Delhi has consistently developed software power. Projects in healthcare, education, pharmaceuticals, and food security, as well as visa facilitation for Afghans, strengthen India\u2019s image and increase local dependence on its presence.<\/p>\n The turning point was the first recent official visits of Taliban representatives to Delhi: Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Commerce Minister Nooruddin Azizi. Reactivation of Indian embassy in Kabul, resumption of air links, and cooperation in healthcare, hydropower, and sports were agreed. Azizi presented a package of incentives for Indian investors: five-year tax breaks, minimal (1%) customs duties, and priority access to land leases in sectors such as mining, pharmaceuticals, and hydropower.<\/p>\n Afghanistan remains an area of strategic importance yet burdened by uncertainty. Despite lack of formal recognition, India-Taliban relations are deepening, serving as tool for risk management and regaining strategic space. Reactivation of a limited diplomatic presence in Kabul allows for continuation of development projects but doesn\u2019t eliminate risks related to competition from China or potential destabilising actions by Pakistan.<\/p>\n The escalating conflict between Taliban government and Islamabad is indirectly fostering rapprochement between Afghanistan and India, increasing Delhi\u2019s manoeuvrability in the region. Pakistan perceives India\u2019s presence in Afghanistan as a threat, accusing it of supporting terrorist organisations such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatists, further complicating regional security dynamics.<\/p>\n Afghanistan is becoming a battleground for access to Central Asia, where transportation infrastructure serves to build political influence. The most dynamically developing corridor is the Uzbekistan\u2013Afghanistan\u2013Pakistan, supported by China and linked to the CPEC. It shortens transit to approximately five days and strengthens Pakistan\u2019s role as a logistics hub, deepening Afghanistan\u2019s dependence on Beijing and Islamabad.<\/p>\n Central Asia offers India some room to maneuver, particularly in sectors that don\u2019t conflict with China\u2019s interests, although Beijing\u2019s economic and infrastructural presence in the region remains a significant factor limiting its freedom of action. The region\u2019s states pursue multi-vector policies, seeking partners who do not impose hegemonic conditions. India is perceived here as stable, predictable, and offering cooperation based on education, skills transfer, and technology.<\/p>\n It encompasses several key areas \u2014 projects in ICT; educational initiatives related to IITs\u00a0 being implemented; bilateral trade exceeds $2 billion, with investments concentrated in energy sector, among others. Although India does not fully constitute a geopolitical counterweight to China, it can play a balancing role in selected sectors, increasing the flexibility of the region\u2019s multi-vector policies.<\/p>\n A discreet competition for resources, energy access, and political influence is underway in Central Asia. Russia is trying to maintain its traditional sphere of influence, China is expanding the BRI, and Turkey is developing pan-Turkish cooperation. Beijing is responding to India\u2019s actions by strengthening cooperation with Iran\u2014primarily in energy sector\u2014and expanding the China-Pakistan CPEC corridor. It aims to maintain its advantage in the southern section of Eurasian trade routes and limit India\u2019s room for manoeuvre.<\/p>\n Islamabad perceives India\u2019s presence in Iran and Afghanistan as a threat to its strategic depth. The weakening importance of transit routes through Afghanistan, reduces Pakistan\u2019s role as a link between South and Central Asia and Middle East. In response, Pakistan has engaged in diplomatic and intelligence activities aimed at restoring its influence in Afghanistan and controlling the Taliban\u2019s relations with Delhi.<\/p>\n Islamabad is balancing Chinese interests with its own strategic autonomy in the region, leveraging its influence channels to maintain independence in key political and economic decisions. China and Pakistan\u2019s actions must also be understood in the context of broader regional rivalry, including the growing presence of India and the US in South and Central Asia.<\/p>\n India\u2019s Western shift is the result of the collaboration of several key power centers, each interpreting it through the prism of its own priorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs views this strategy as a tool for political diversification, allowing India to expand its influence beyond its immediate neighborhood and reduce its dependence on Sino-Pakistani pressure.<\/p>\n The NSC sees the pivot as an instrument to manage the risks associated with terrorism and the stability of Afghanistan, which remains a crucial element of regional security. The Indian Army sees the Western vector as an opportunity to relieve the Himalayan front by shifting its strategic attention to new operational areas. In turn, the ruling BJP sees this orientation as evidence of India\u2019s growing position in the global system, its ability to shape its own geopolitical space and build a soft power. power on the international stage.<\/p>\n The shift, a process that has been ongoing since the middle of last decade, is result of an integrated approach by various centers of power, skillfully combining the priorities of security, the economy, and India\u2019s global image. \u2014INFA<\/p>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" India’s West Path By Piotr Opalinski (Expert, Centre for International Relations, Poland) India\u2019s increased involvement in Afghanistan and its consistent pursuit of developing cooperation with Iran and Central Asian states are part of a broader strategy for balancing a geopolitical environment increasingly shaped by China\u2019s growing power. This pivot to the West is becoming a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-275854","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-features"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/275854","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=275854"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/275854\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=275854"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=275854"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/arunachaltimes.in\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=275854"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}