Trilateral Dialogue in Beijing
By Piotr Opalinski
(Former Diplomat, Centre for International
Relations, Poland)
On May 21, 2025, an informal, tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers of China, Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar, and Afghanistan’s Amir Khan Muttaqi was held in Beijing. The aim of this Chinese initiative was to ease tensions between Islamabad and Kabul, which had intensified after the deportation – from April 1, 2025 – of over 84,000 Afghans from Pakistan under the second phase of the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan. The meeting also served as a platform for dialogue on deepening economic and infrastructure cooperation, including the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project to Afghanistan. It was announced that the next round of talks would be held in Kabul.
China pursues a highly pragmatic policy towards the Taliban government. Despite the lack of formal recognition, it maintains full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level – indicating de facto recognition resulting from strategic and economic calculations. This pragmatic approach is driven by both security considerations – particularly those related to the situation in the Xinjiang region and countering extremism – and important economic interests.
Chinese companies have already signed concession agreements with the Taliban government, including in the field of oil extraction (USD 540 million), and are also planning investments worth USD 10 billion in the lithium deposits sector. Work is underway to launch a copper mine in Mes Aynak – one of the largest unexploited deposits of this raw material in the world, managed by the Chinese company MCC. Beijing is also financing the construction of road infrastructure, including a route connecting Badakhshan province with Chinese Xinjiang via the Wakhan Corridor. These investments not only strengthen China’s economic presence, but also aim to create a safe transport corridor, bypassing areas not controlled by the Taliban.
From a security perspective, Beijing expects the Taliban to firmly curb the activities of Islamist groups that threaten China, especially the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Chinese authorities have consistently emphasized that Afghan territory cannot be used as a base of operations for separatist groups.
China’s relations with Pakistan are strategic and long-term. Islamabad is considered by Beijing as an “iron friend for all seasons,” which is reflected in infrastructure, economic and military cooperation. Of fundamental importance is the expansion of CPEC, a flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which provides China with land access to the Indian Ocean through the port of Gwadar.
Beijing is pressuring Pakistan to step up protection of Chinese investments and personnel in the face of repeated terrorist attacks. The joint coordination of policies toward Afghanistan aims not only to limit the influence of armed groups but also to create effective trade routes and promote stability in the difficult border region.
The Beijing meeting is part of China’s broader strategy of building a regional security architecture independent of Western influence. The tightening of cooperation with Pakistan and Afghanistan can be interpreted as an attempt to form a “regional stabilization triangle” based on diplomacy, infrastructure investment and energy security.
Extending CPEC to Afghanistan could transform the country into a regional trading hub , linking the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe. While the project promises economic growth and stability, it has also drawn opposition—particularly from India—that has hindered broader regional integration and increased the risk of geopolitical polarisation.
India has expressed strong opposition to the expansion of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan, viewing it as a violation of its sovereignty and a threat to its strategic interests in the region. The main sticking point is the fact that CPEC runs through the Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir, which India considers an integral part of its state. As such, any infrastructure projects in this area are considered illegal and unacceptable by New Delhi.
Expanding CPEC also raises concerns in India about the strengthening of China and Pakistan in the region, which could undermine New Delhi’s strategic ambitions in Central Asia. India has invested heavily in developing the Chabahar port in Iran, which is expected to provide a key link in an alternative trade route to Afghanistan and beyond to Central Asia. Including Afghanistan in CPEC could limit the significance of this project and reduce India’s influence in the region.
In addition, New Delhi is concerned that China’s presence in Afghanistan could increase security threats, including the risk of Afghan territory being used by groups operating against India. New Delhi therefore appeals to the international community to heed these concerns and refrain from supporting projects which it believes have the potential to deepen instability and perpetuate geopolitical divisions.
Although New Delhi does not formally recognise the Taliban government, it maintains pragmatic contacts with it – mainly concerning security and trade, motivated by strategic considerations and concern for its own interests in the region. According to unofficial media reports, in early May, during the escalation of Indian-Pakistani tensions after the Pahalgam attack, Mullah Muhammad Ibrahim Sadr, the Taliban’s deputy interior minister for security, was supposed to be in the Indian capital. A few days later, on May 15, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar had a telephone conversation with the acting head of Afghan diplomacy Amir Khan Muttaqi, thanking him for condemning the attack and distancing himself from the Pakistani narrative. Issues of economic, visa and transport cooperation were also raised, including the use of the Chabahar port bypassing Pakistani territory.
In addition, despite the closed border crossings with Pakistan, India allowed 160 Afghan trucks carrying dried fruits to enter through the Wagah-Attari border. These actions indicate India’s pragmatic approach, which is trying to secure its interests in Afghanistan and balance the influence of China and Pakistan in the region.
Through simultaneous diplomatic engagement towards Pakistan and Afghanistan, China is consistently building a narrative of its own role as a mediator and guarantor of regional stability. Its infrastructure and economic investments are both a tool for building influence and a challenge to regional and supra-regional powers such as India and the United States.
Beijing knows that its presence in Afghanistan and involvement in projects such as CPEC will be met with further criticism and resistance from many countries, notably over sovereignty issues and ethnic and religious tensions. But it’s clear “connector” strategy – between Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East – points to China’s growing role as a regional leader.
The meeting in Beijing is an important step towards building a trilateral format of cooperation that can bring stability, but also potentially contribute to new divisions in South Asia. The China-Pakistan-Afghan “triangle “ shows that the geopolitics of this region is taking on a new dimension, combining economic interests with security challenges and great-power rivalry. The development of the situation will depend on the parties’ further ability to compromise, which may prove to be particularly difficult due to the deep prejudices and distrust between Kabul and Islamabad, as well as the reactions of external actors, especially India and the US, which will not easily accept Beijing’s growing influence. — INFA