India-Pak Conflict
By Piotr Opalinski
(Former Diplomat, Centre for International Relations, Poland)
The May crisis between India and Pakistan revealed the fragility of the security architecture in South Asia. Although the formal de-escalation ended the armed conflict, it does not mean a return to the status quo ante. On the contrary, we are dealing with a permanent degradation of relations: deepening distrust, intensified signals of deterrence and the lack of effective mechanisms to prevent further tensions. This crisis was not an episode, but a signal of deeper and more lasting strategic changes in the region.
Over 30 countries, including global actors: the US, Great Britain and China, supported the diplomatic efforts to de-escalate. The talks between US Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan – Narendra Modi and Shehbaz Sharif – and also with the Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, Gen. Asim Munir.
Although President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire on 10 May, the agreement proved fragile and quickly became the subject of differing interpretations. Pakistan presented it as a statement of responsibility, signalling its readiness to respond with a nuclear weapon if escalated. India stressed that the ceasefire was reached “at Pakistan’s request”, solely through bilateral contacts and without the involvement of third parties. Indian commentators, in turn, criticised the manner in which Trump announced it, claiming that it had saved Pakistan from military defeat. They emphasised that it had damaged the image of Prime Minister Modi, who had denied that the talks with the US had influenced the decision to call a ceasefire.
It also highlighted an investment deal with Pakistan by a cryptocurrency company linked to the Trump family, as well as extraordinary foreign aid relief for Islamabad, including the exemption of $396 million in security aid and the omission of Pakistan from a list of countries subject to U.S. travel restrictions. The crisis has revealed a change in Washington’s approach – a shift away from preventive action towards reactive interventions, which is lowering the security threshold in the region and increasing the sense of instability.
As a result, de-escalation was purely tactical – it limited kinetic actions but did not bring about real strategic détente. At the structural level, the fundamental divergence over Kashmir remains an obstacle, and the asymmetry of nuclear doctrines increases the risk of miscalculations. There is also a lack of institutional instruments for crisis management, such as permanent channels of military communication or mechanisms for preventing incidents.
Despite the declared defensive nature of nuclear doctrines – India’s “No First Use” and Pakistan ’s flexible deterrence strategy – in conditions of intense conventional conflict, the line between deterrence and actual use of nuclear weapons can blur rapidly. Public pressure, disinformation and the automation of military decisions increase the risk of unintended escalation.
The Indian subcontinent remains an area particularly susceptible to escalation due to persistent territorial disputes, acts of cross-border violence. The problem is not only the presence of “triggers” of the conflict, but above all the lack of effective “fuses” – institutional mechanisms of crisis communication, common procedures, and political channels for de-escalation. Developing these should become a priority if the region is to avoid an accidental nuclear catastrophe.
India’s shift in approach has far-reaching implications for regional stability, the interpretation of international law, and the strategic calculations of actors such as China, the United States, and the UN in the context of managing low-intensity conflicts. For Islamabad, this means revising its deterrence strategy, strengthening alliances and pursuing more offensive public diplomacy aimed at building long-term partnerships. Awareness of India’s advantage may encourage Pakistan to more strongly emphasize the threat of early use of nuclear weapons within the framework of the “first use”, which paradoxically deepens regional instability.
The exchange of blows with India has prompted Pakistan to increase its defence spending by 20%, or $9 billion a year, in the budget for the new fiscal year starting July 1. The increase comes despite an overall 7% cut in public spending, clearly indicating a shift in government priorities towards national security.
Given the escalation in May, Pakistan’s “full spectrum deterrence” doctrine has proven inadequate, failing to deter even limited enemy military operations. Islamabad may therefore consider shifting its strategic emphasis from conventional military forces to nuclear arsenal by increasing the number of warheads, developing tactical nuclear weapons, and delivery systems such as aircraft and short- and medium-range missiles.
At the same time, Pakistan is investing in its air force. Shortly after the Indian attack in May, the government in Islamabad ordered 40 Chinese fifth-generation J-35A stealth fighters. The first deliveries are to take place within two years. In addition, Beijing has agreed to sell KJ-500 airborne early warning and command (AEW&C) systems and HQ-19 missile defence systems as part of a broad military deal.
Beijing’s agreement to deliver cutting-edge aircraft and air defence systems to Pakistan is more than just an arms deal—it is an unambiguous geostrategic signal. China does not see Pakistan as just a client, but as a pillar of regional balance and a key defence partner. This privileged relationship was also confirmed by the earlier transfer of advanced PL-15E air-to-air missiles, most likely before the escalation with India.
These purchases are part of a broader strategy of strengthening military cooperation between the two countries and indicate the growing interoperability of their armed forces. The introduction of the J-35A fighters into service alone could significantly change the balance of power in South Asia. The Indian Air Force, still relying on 4+ generation aircraft such as the Rafale, may be forced to accelerate fleet modernization and investment in programs to develop its own fifth generation fighters. This could usher in a new phase of the regional arms race, with a stronger technological component and greater involvement of third countries.
In parallel to its priority strategy of multidimensional political, military and economic partnership with China, Pakistan is strengthening cooperation with selected Muslim countries – such as Turkey, Iran and Qatar – to counterbalance the growing partnership between India and the Gulf states. India, in turn, taking advantage of its growing global position and status as a balancer to China, is strengthening its strategic relations with the United States and its QUAD partners (USA, Japan, Australia). It is also systematically developing cooperation with the GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, integrating the economic, energy, and defence dimensions.
Both Islamabad and New Delhi are thus engaged in building competitive strategic blocs that go beyond the traditional balance of power in South Asia and fit into the broader context of the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.
Without a strong institutional security framework and effective diplomacy, future crises could easily cross current boundaries, leading to more serious confrontations. What is needed are not only further rounds of talks, but above all credible preventive mechanisms and the reconstruction of a minimum level of strategic trust.
Poland, as a member of the European Union and NATO, in the face of the changing security architecture, should use the existing formats of partnership with India to systematically strengthen its diplomatic and economic presence in South Asia. Participation in recognized dialogue mechanisms is key – such as the EU-India Strategic Partnership, NATO initiatives for cooperation with the countries of the subcontinent or bilateral consultation platforms – which help build trust and regional stability.
Thanks to consistent, long-term engagement in these formats, Poland can strengthen its image as a credible participant in international security processes and gain recognition both from India – which carefully analyses the positions of external partners – and Pakistan, whose perception of the region’s stability is linked to the resolution of the Kashmir issue and strategic balance with India. — INFA