Central Asia Geostrategy
By Piotr Opaliñski
(Centre fort International Relations, Poland)
Central Asia, for over a century perceived as an arena of struggle between external powers, and during the Cold War confined within the structures of the USSR, is today increasingly formulating its own strategic agenda. The region’s states are pursuing multi-vector policies, balancing influence and developing a network of partnerships encompassing both global players – China, the US, Russia, India, and European Union – and regional actors such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Gulf states.
The contemporary version of the “Great Game” is not only a race for raw materials and trade routes, but also for technological, digital, and institutional dominance. Alternative models of cooperation and mechanisms based on competence, systemic resilience, and a lack of political conditionality are gaining importance. A region once considered peripheral is now emerging as an autonomous actor and a hub of the new Eurasian architecture. The involvement of key global and regional geopolitical actors in Central Asia is part of a broader process of transforming Eurasia into a polycentric space.
The first summit of leaders of China and Central Asian states (C+C5 format) in May 2023 in Xi’an established a permanent platform for cooperation, which included 19 points concerning cooperation in political, infrastructure, energy, and education. The Chinese narrative emphasized a “common destiny” and a “new golden age of Sino-Central Asian relations.” Beijing proposed expanding the New Silk Road to include digital and climate components, deepening energy cooperation, promoting academic exchanges and technical training, and establishing special investment funds for regional development.
At the second summit in June 2025 in Astana, the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the C+C5 format in Kazakhstan was agreed upon, along with plans to build a joint data center and a new technology exchange platform—the China-Central Asia Digital Hub.
In this way, China seeks to institutionalize its presence in Central Asia outside the framework of the SCO, while simultaneously limiting the influence of Russia and the West. The C+C5 format is becoming increasingly attractive to the region’s republics, offering rapid investment, a lack of political conditionality, and the opportunity to diversify cooperation channels. This model significantly shifts the geopolitical balance of power in Central Asia, increasing the region’s dependence on Beijing and strengthening its strategic position.
Likewise, India is consistently developing strategic partnerships with Central Asian countries, with particular emphasis on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, strengthening economic, technological, and educational ties. The India-Central Asia Dialogue has been in operation since 2019, and its importance was further enhanced by a virtual leaders’ summit held in January 2022. In May 2025, the Narendra Modi government announced the comprehensive “Indo-Eurasian Connect 2025” strategy, whose pillars include the development of transport infrastructure (Chabahar Port, North-South Corridor), technological cooperation (IT, cybersecurity, precision agriculture), education, and strengthening trade, including through the creation of SEZs in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
New Delhi is leveraging soft power tools—such as technology diplomacy, academic cooperation, and educational offerings—to build an image of a predictable and partner-oriented actor in the region. For India, Central Asia remains a crucial area for counterbalancing the influence of China and Pakistan, and a field for the expansion of its Eurasian foreign policy.
Russia plays a key role in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), using these formats to maintain its political and military influence in the region. However, it increasingly encounters resistance from its partners, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which seek to reduce their dependence on Moscow and redefine their relations on a more equal footing.
The European Union is developing cooperation with Central Asian countries within the EU-C5 framework, strengthening political dialogue and development opportunities. At the Samarkand Summit in April 2025, a €12 billion investment package was announced as part of the Global Gateway strategy. These funds are to be allocated to energy (€6.4 billion), transport (€3 billion), and critical raw materials and digitalization (€2.5 billion). The EU doesn’t compete directly with China or Russia but proposes an alternative model of cooperation – based on transparency, sustainable development, high environmental standards, and labour regulations.
The US is conducting dialogue with Central Asian countries within the C5+1 format, launched in 2015 as a platform for cooperation in the areas of security, energy, education, and support for regional sovereignty. In July 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Uzbek Foreign Minister, confirming continued cooperation in key sectors: energy transformation, digitalization, supply chain security, and Afghanistan’s integration into the regional trade architecture. The political format is complemented by the B5+1 (Business 5+1) initiative, focused on economic cooperation, logistics, e-commerce, renewable energy sources, and tourism.
Central Asian states are increasingly adopting a balancing strategy, utilizing both options and avoiding a clear commitment to either side. This multi-vector approach and pragmatism in infrastructure policy allow for the maximization of benefits from available financing sources and cooperation.
Central Asia is becoming a significant area of global competition for strategic critical raw materials—primarily uranium and lithium—which play a key role in energy transformation and security policy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as leading uranium producers, are attracting the interest of Russia, China, and France, which compete not only for access to deposits but also for control over processing, logistics, and nuclear technologies.
The EU sees Central Asia as an opportunity to diversify its critical raw materials supply. Under the Critical Raw Materials Act program, it promotes investments consistent with ESG standards and is considering privileged access for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the European market, provided that supply stability is ensured. Lithium is becoming the region’s new “white gold”—a bargaining chip that attracts investment and strengthens the negotiating position of the Central Asian republics.
Contemporary competition in the Central Asian region goes beyond the traditional struggle for raw materials and physical infrastructure to encompass issues related to data, digital standards, and technological sovereignty. Kazakhstan is investing in the development of the IT sector and nuclear energy, Uzbekistan is implementing e-government solutions, and Turkmenistan is experimenting with technological cooperation with China. The construction of 5G infrastructure, the development of data centers, the implementation of blockchain technology, and discussions on digital sovereignty constitute a new front of geostrategic competition.
Amid rising tensions with the West, many countries in the region view China’s “authoritarian digital model” as an attractive alternative to Western standards of transparency, data protection, and regulation of technology corporations.
Central Asian states are increasingly consistently pursuing a multi-vector policy, consciously avoiding subordination to a single center of power. Kazakhstan is developing a close partnership with Turkey, Uzbekistan is intensifying dialogue and cooperation with EU, and Turkmenistan is investing in autonomous energy connections. Central Asia’s role is becoming increasingly clear not only as an object of rivalry, but as an independent entity shaping a balanced network of international relations promoting stability, diversification, and development.
The region is becoming a laboratory for a new multipolar order – devoid of a hegemonic center, but based on a multi-layered network of connections and partnerships. New players with their own agendas are emerging on the scene – India, UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
A long-term challenge and opportunity for the region’s countries will be maintaining a balance between the interests of external powers, retaining added value in the form of knowledge, technology, and jobs, and defending decision-making autonomy in the face of growing external pressure. Increasingly, Central Asia is emerging not as an object of geopolitical games, but as an independent actor shaping its own strategic environment.
The new “Great Game” in Central Asia does not lead to a clear-cut outcome – the direction of change is not predetermined. The region’s future will depend on its ability to autonomously balance external influences, diversify investments, and translate global competition into lasting benefits for societies and local institutions. It is the agency and flexibility of regional actors that may determine the shape of the new balance of power in Eurasia. — INFA