PM Modi in SCO
By Dr. D.K. Giri
(Prof of Practice, NIIS Group of Institutions)
It goes without saying that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s performance in the 25th SCO Summit in Tianjin marked a dramatic shift in India’s foreign policy. Such a sudden strategic turn has hardly been witnessed in India’s foreign policy since 1947. During 80s and 90s, ‘continuity and change’ was the standard norm in India’s foreign policy making. During the Congress era, changing the foreign policy structure created by the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was considered imprudent and impractical. Nehru was perceived to be the architect of India’s foreign policy.
Admittedly, Nehru’s concept of Non-Alignment persists in one form or the other. Now it is called strategic autonomy, multi-alignment, Global South (solidarity) or Active Non-Alignment (mainly in Latin America). Nehru’s foreign policy, including Non-Alignment, after the decline of Congress regime, has been subjected to serious evaluation and coruscating criticism. This is, however, not the intent today, to engage in that exercise. Suffice to say that Narendra Modi, with all his innovative ideas, has not discarded lock, stock and barrel, the principle and rhetoric of Non-Alignment. It is called strategic autonomy. I have, in this column, engagingly expressed the disappointment about Modi somewhat following Nehru’s foreign policy paradigm. Note that Modi’s regime has been otherwise critical of Nehru’s policies.
Tianjin drastically changed all that perception some of us held since 2014. In Tianjin, Modi jumped into the bandwagon of Sino-Russian camp and revived the dormant and inactive Trilateral, Russia-India-China (RIC). From the photo-opps and personal conduct, Modi gave a clear message to the world that he is seeking to firm-up the global alliance of these three countries. The bonhomie witnessed between Modi and Putin – walking hand-in-hand to the summit, travelling in the same car, one-to-one tete-a-tete upto 45 minutes demonstrated a remarkable personal bond. Similar proximity, although a bit less warm, was noticed between Modi and Xi Jinping. Let us not forget that Modi had experienced similar warmth and closeness with American President Donald Trump in his first term. It is another matter that now the chemistry between the two has gone off.
Therefore, it is evident in global geo-politics that hugs and handshakes, swings and strolls (Wuhan and Sabarmati Riverfront) do not change the focus on national interests. They have not normalised the bilateralism between China and India. The military clashes between both countries in 2013, 2014, 2017 and 2020 confirm China’s growing belligerence on the borders. The 2020 clashes that killed over 20 Indian soldiers happened after the meetings in Wuhan and Sabarmati. In Tianjin, Modi committed to “taking forward the ties… based on mutual trust, respect and sensitivity”. Xi Jinping called for the “Dragon (China) and the Elephant (India) to come together”.
Counting the outcomes of Tianjin Summit, Modi secured a consensus against terrorism. Significantly, Tianjin Declaration included strong language against cross-border terrorism. It condemned the attack on civilians in Pahalgam and against Pakistani forces in Balochistan. Remarkably, there was common ground among the entire SCO membership on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza and in condemnation of US-Israeli strikes on Iran. For the first time, Prime Minister Modi proposed the construction of a Civilisation Dialogue Forum. In his speech, Modi proposed the formation of such a dialogue in order to enhance people-to-people ties in the SCO and to have a platform for the member countries to share their ancient civilisation, culture, traditions and literature.
Modi underlined the importance of connectivity projects for overall development in member countries. He, however, underscored that such projects respect sovereignty, and territorial integrity aligning with the fundamental principle of the SCO Charter. Modi added that “connectivity that bypasses sovereignty loses trust and meaning. The connectivity should not be meant only for trade but also for fostering trade and development”. That is why Modi cited the examples of Chahbahar Port, The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) to connect North and South. However, as before, India maintained its opposition to the paragraph in the Declaration supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
While all the above constituted a ‘productive’ visit to China as Modi described, he skipped the SCO Plus Summit and the Victory Day Parade. Whether it was deliberate or was due to his preoccupation, Modi missed the opportunity for closer engagement with leaders from India’s neighbourhood and Global South. In any case, Modi’s China visit is globally discussed, thanks to the high-handed approach by Donald Trump towards India. Modi’s sudden switch to the above-mentioned trilateral RIC was prompted by Trump’s 50 per cent tariff on India and his ‘bullying’ India to avoid buying Russian oil.
The big strategic question is, whether Modi has reacted too soon and a bit much to Donald Trump’s ‘capricious’ behaviour. What the World witnessed in Tianjin masks the structural contradictions between China and India and overshadows the structural similarities and shared realities between Delhi and Washington. The recent contretemps between Trump Administration and Modi’s team, could be a passing phase. Donald Trump is known for changing his mind. He is seized with the burden of ending the war in Ukraine. In this, he wanted India’s support in cutting off the oil revenue of Russia.
Donald Trump is already under severe criticism from his detractors including the Opposition Democratic Party. His former NSA Jack Sullivan has come down heavily on Trump for undoing the good work with India for over last three decades. Worse, critics have accused Trump for torpedoing India-America relations for the sake of personal business in Pakistan. Be that as they may, India seems to have changed sides too soon. Despite professing strategic autonomy, India was moving closer to the democratic world, America and Europe, but perhaps without fullest conviction. In a persistent paradox, the South Block in Delhi has somewhat overestimated the possibilities with China and Russia while underestimating those with USA.
That said, China is the most difficult kettle of fish to deal with. Beijing thrives on deception drawing heavily on the Art of War by Sun Tzu written in the 5th Century B.C. During Nehru’s time in 50s, Indians were chanting slogans like Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai (Indian and Chinese are brothers). That false euphoria evaporated in the war of 1962 which India lost, mainly because Nehru did not anticipate and was unprepared for it. The story of betrayal continues. On the one hand, China dialogues with India, on the other, it builds “the String of Pearls”, to surround and suppress India.
Furthermore, unlike China, the US is not sharing borders with India nor does it occupy India’s land. China has border disputes with India and has been in occupation of about 4,800 sq kms of India’s territory. On trade, America is the largest destination of India’s exports giving a surplus of 40b USD. US also is the natural partner of India in politics, economy, science and technology. On the other hand, India’s trade deficit with China is 100b USD.
Finally, let it be acknowledged that Washington cannot build a stable Asian Order without India; likewise India cannot realise its goal of a multi-polar Asia without American cooperation. If India can negotiate with authoritarian China and Russia, it can very well do so with United States that has multiple points of entry in dialogue and diplomacy. — INFA