By Inder Jit
(Released on 11 December 1984)
The poll battle is hotting up. Salvoes are being fired from both sides. Nevertheless, normal life and work must go on. New Delhi has consequently been taking a fresh look at international relations, especially those with the US. The initiative for this has come from Washington. Top American leaders appear anxious to woo Mr Rajiv Gandhi and try to open a new and happier chapter in Indo-US relations. Initially, Mr George Shultz, US Secretary of State, broached the subject when he visited New Delhi following Indira Gandhi’s assassination and talked politics, unlike Mrs Margaret Thatcher, who kept her call on Mr Gandhi strictly personal. Subsequently, the visit was followed first by Senator Clairbone Pell and then by a four-member Senators’ delegation led by Mr Sam Nunn. All of them had only one message. The US strongly supports “a united independent and prosperous India”— and earnestly desires to strengthen Indo-US friendship and mutual cooperation.
From all accounts, Mr Shultz and the Senators who followed him went back satisfied. Their talk with Mr Gandhi was warm, cordial and open. Senators Nunn, Glenn and Johnston were particularly pleased to find Mr Gandhi pragmatic and modern in his approach and outlook. America appears willing to extend its best help and cooperation to India, especially in the field of technology so long as it is assured of a fair deal and does not have to work under the threat of socialisation or nationalisation, directly or indirectly. They even urged Mr Gandhi to go in more for free enterprise and a policy of de-socialisation. Mr Gandhi assured them that he was interested mainly in results. Free enterprise had already been assigned an important role in India’s development. He was willing to consider any proposition so long as it subserved the best national interest. He did not accept the suggestion for a policy of “de-socialisation”. But he said enough to indicate that he is no prisoner of any ism and wants time-bound results from the public sector too.
India and the US should normally have been the best of friends. Both are democracies and committed deeply to fundamental freedoms. Prior to 1947, President Roosevelt played a crucial role in helping India and other British colonies win independence. Yet, things have not gone off well between the two countries, thanks mainly to the difference in their perceptions in regard to the Soviet Union and Washington’s obsession with communism. The US continues to view the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to peace and security and its way of life. Consequently, it evolved during the time of John Foster Dulles a policy of containment of communism through a ring of military bases around the Soviet Union. India was approached to join the military pacts. But Nehru firmly turned down any question of joining a military bloc — and came forward with his own policy of non-alignment, a projection of India’s sovereignty at home to sovereignty abroad. Matters worsened when in sharp contrast Pakistan became America’s military ally-—and Dulles denounced non-alignment as “immoral”.
New Delhi’s relations with Washington hit its lowest when America backed Pakistan on Kashmir at the UN. New Delhi was forced to fall back on Moscow, which is now seen as a true friend in need — both in regard to Kashmir and the 1971 war. Indeed, Kashmir and Pakistan still largely determine India’s foreign policy. Few in New Delhi today care to recall that in 1962 it was Washington which gave India timely help against China, not Moscow. India was then only a friend to the Soviet Union and China an ally! Alas, the misunderstanding has been deepened by the developments in Afghanistan, even when the Soviet occupation of the country goes against India’s interests. (Nehru held the firm view that India’s security frontier lay along the Oxus.)New Delhi viewed the Soviet action as constituting a new threat to the sub-continent. But the US decision to rush military aid to Pakistan without a word with New Delhi instantly changed the situation. A threat to the sub-continent was transformed overnight into a renewed threat to India from Pakistan.
India continues to be strongly opposed to renewed military aid to Pakistan and, more especially, to the supply of the deadly F-16s and, possibly, of AWACS. Mr Gandhi made this abundantly clear to Mr Shultz as also to the Senators — a view followed up by the Prime Minister’s top aides at their meetings with the visiting VVIPs. Mr Gandhi also conveyed to the US Secretary of State India’s concern over Pakistan’s nuclear plans. New Delhi is convinced that Pakistan is going ahead with its plans to build an “Islamic Bomb”, notwithstanding President Zia’s repeated denials and the noises made in Washington. In fact, one top expert even told the Senators that unless Washington woke up to this harsh reality, it would face the biggest ever problem of nuclear proliferation, notwithstanding dedicated efforts by Senators Glenn, Cranston and others. Islamabad, according to the expert, will be able to produce the “bomb” before very long and then sell it to the Arab world as the “Islamic Bomb”. Pakistan and Gen Zia would stand greatly to gain. But the world would be pushed closer to the brink of nuclear disaster.
Tragically, President Reagan and his administration fail to see reason and good sense behind New Delhi’s stand and continue to miss out on India’s psyche and basic approach. Washington does not still view its aid to Pakistan as constituting a threat to India. It insists (as did the Senators) that its decision to rearm Pakistan is vital from the viewpoint of containing the Soviet Union. The Senators even argued — as did John Foster Dulles in the early 1950s — that the military aid being pumped into Pakistan is in the larger interests of India and the sub-continent. But in doing so they ignore the fact that the rearming of Pakistan is no answer either to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan or to the containment of communism. All the aid that is being poured into Pakistan cannot possibly stop the Soviets militarily. But the aid has further bedevilled relations between India and Pakistan and prevented New Delhi from putting its head together with Islamabad to meet the threat to the sub-continent.
New Delhi impressed on the Senators its view that Gen Zia is using Afghanistan for his own purposes and is, indeed, taking Washington for a ride. Nothing suits the General more than massive US military aid in the context of his plans to perpetuate himself in power — plans since further confirmed by his farcical offer of a referendum which amounts to bluntly saying: “Heads I win, tails I win!” Senators, for their part, argued that India had no reason to fear Pakistan. India would be militarily superior even after all the promised aid was given. However, they were told that India’s military superiority was not new. It had proved itself superior initially in 1947 and again in 1964, 1965 and 1971. Nevertheless, this had not made Pakistan see reason and desist from repeated military adventures. These had cost India heavily and deflected it from its primary task of development and of banishing poverty. In fact, the Senators were candidly told that the recent riots in Delhi had underlined the need to step up the fight against poverty. They were marked by an attack by the have nots on the haves – the first shots in a class war.
Much of the trouble stems from the fact that the US does not appear to be clear about the best way of getting the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. Washington has advisedly ruled out military action. The answer lies in a political solution. India alone is in a position to play a useful role and provide the two Super Powers a meaningful channel of communication and dialogue. Yet, the US has not thought it fit to persuade itself and Pakistan to involve Indian the exercise. New Delhi is clear that talks for a solution of the Afghan imbroglio have to be held not only with the Soviet leaders but also with the Afghan Government. True, this would amount to are cognition of the Babrak Karmal regime. But then New Delhi asks: Did not Washington recognise Red China when it decided to talk to Beijing? Did Sadaat not deal directly with Israel? New Delhi is also opposed to continued aid to the Mujahideen and feels it would only end up in turning Afghanistan into another Sovietised Mongolia, as amply indicated by Brezhnev to Indira Gandhi during his visit to New Delhi in December 1980.
The Reagan administration needs to be clear on certain fundamentals vis-a-vis India, the sub-continent and the region. Washington cannot talk of greater friendship and a new chapter in mutual relations even as it plays politics in India’s backyard and ignores this country’s vital interests. India has as great a stake as Pakistan or the US in getting the Russian Bear only to drink the waters of the Oxus and not of the Indus or the Arabian Sea. The US also needs to take cognisance of the fact that its policy of rearming Pakistan is only pushing India more and more into the Soviet arms, as during the early 50s. (Where else does India get matching or superior aircraft or military hardware?) What is more, this policy is encouraging Pakistan to create trouble in Punjab through the extremists. The US administration also needs to understand that India is strong enough to deal with the extremists. Pakistan, too, has to be made to appreciate this. India may have its plate overfull. But it has, once again, showed its remarkable capacity to meet challenges as shown by Mr Rajiv Gandhi’s peaceful elevation to the office of Prime Minister.
New Delhi has made it clear to the visiting Senators that India has no designs on Pakistan and, contrary to what Islamabad might say, is genuinely interested in seeing it strong and stable. India seeks nothing but peace and stability in the sub-continent. Washington’s interest lies in pursuing a policy which will strengthen peace and stability in the sub-continent. It can do so best by recognising India’s position and in making it an anchor of stability and development in the region. It must recognise that the more it diverts India from its primary task of development the more it strengthens the forces of destabilisation. Importantly, it appreciates India’s position in the region. Ironically, however, it builds up Pakistan as a bulwark. Mr Shultz assured Mr Gandhi that the US viewed India with “sympathy and understanding” and stood for “a stable and prosperous India”. The assurance will have meaning only if Washington corrects its perspectives, perceptions and priorities. New Delhi will judge Washington not by its professions but by its actions. — INFA