Trump In Middle East
By Juliusz Gojto
(Centre for International Relations, Poland)
During his four-day visit to the Middle East in mid-May, US President Donald Trump concluded unprecedented trade agreements worth over $2 trillion. These include, among others, obtaining Saudi Arabia’s declaration of investment in the US of $600 billion, an economic exchange agreement with Qatar worth $1.2 trillion and trade and defence contracts worth $243.5 billion, plus $200 billion trade agreements with the UAE. The Trump administration presented these agreements as a success not only economically, but also geostrategically – intended to contribute to the stabilisation of the region through economic development and deepening defence cooperation.
The economic aspect is obvious: the scale of the obligations is unprecedented, the numbers arouse both admiration and enthusiasm and often surprise, bordering on disbelief. But what do these data say about the politics in the region? For many, they are heralds of Washington’s new approach to the Middle East. Alongside the delights, there are also many questions, the most important of which concern the essence of this change, the mechanisms behind it, and its significance for the region’s future.
This was Trump’s first foreign visit in his second term. It came quite late, counting from the moment of his re-election. However, this delay is symptomatic, considering the pendulum logic of American foreign policy described by Kissinger, as actions of current administration constitute only a swing towards isolationism. For other reasons, the choice of Middle East is not surprising. It’s a consistent continuation of the vision of foreign policy in which the region becomes not so much a space of conflicts as a market – a place of exchanging influence for investments, security for the smiles of autocrats, sanctions for momentary loyalty.
A policy implemented not only in this region, although it is particularly expressive here. Trump has been pushing it since his first term in 2017. Its features are primarily transactional, personalisation, revisionism and deinstitutionalisation – all in the framework of isolationism, as visible as it is shallow.
If politics is understood as the art of achieving goals – with the proviso that the way to achieve them is also important – then for Trump it is a brutally simplified logic of a transaction that justifies the means, prioritising short-term profits and spectacularity. He doesn’t hide the fact he’s driven by the desire to secure investments in the US and projects that could transform the unstable region into a profitable “resort for investors”. As he himself said in Riyadh: “Before our eyes, a new generation of leaders is transcending old divisions and building a Middle East based on trade, not chaos.” According to this logic, peace and stability are not values in themselves, but side effects of investments, infrastructure projects and lucrative contracts.
The balance of the visit speaks for itself: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE promised billions of dollars in investment in American infrastructure, technology and energy. In return, Trump offered, as he put it, “technology, security and a new vision of peace.” Foreign policy has been monetised here – reduced to a pure arithmetic of profits, in which ideological or moral dilemmas have no place. Additionally, the puzzle being implemented here undoubtedly also considers the challenges in the Far East due to the growing tensions in relations with Beijing.
Trump’s trip to the Persian Gulf – like his spectacular visit to Riyadh in 2017 – is a demonstration of the personalization of international relations and the belief that personal relationships between leaders (or rather people in power) give meaning to relations between states. His meetings with heir to the throne of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman, Emir of Qatar, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and UAE leaders were not interstate consultations, but rather a dialogue of leaders, bypassing traditional procedures and diplomatic channels.
Personalisation, although effective in the media, carries both consternation and serious risk: it subordinates national interest to the emotions and private interests of one person. Of particular significance is the meeting with Ahmed al-Sharaa, for whose head – as a jihadist terrorist – Washington was ready to pay millions of dollars in reward just a year ago. Another manifestation is the replacement of lofty values with personae and prejudices. The visit was manifested by an undisguised fascination with wealth, luxury and presumption of agency that they bring. It’s not the first time that US president is impressed by both the ostentatious splendour and glitz available only to petrodollar monarchies, as well as the accompanying nonchalance in demonstrating power – a trait characteristic mainly of autocrats.
On Trump’s Middle East policy, former US ambassador to Syria Robert Ford says: “It’s a rejection of the neoconservative approach. It’s a much more restrained doctrine, focused on promoting business. Trump has not even invoked soft power but has focused on investment in America and young entrepreneurs from the Middle East.” Trump does not resolve burgeoning conflicts, he temporarily immobilises them with money and promises. It’s a strategy of managing chaos through the appearance of stabilisation.
Trump’s visit can’t be interpreted in isolation from his overall perspective on the international order. It is a revisionist vision – although not in the traditional, aggressive sense of the word, but rather as a consistent undermining of the existing framework and rules. Trump does not seek to build new institutions or security architecture; on the contrary, his actions are aimed at dismantling the existing order, which he considers ineffective, corrupt or unfair to the US. In place of institutions, he promotes ad hoc arrangements, bilateral contracts and direct relations with leaders – preferring the logic of the deal over the logic of the system. In practice, this is a return to the 19th century philosophy of the balance of power and ad hoc diplomacy.
This has tangible consequences for both US institutions and the international system. Trump has consistently weakened the significance of traditional bodies that directly and indirectly shape foreign policy: State Department, Pentagon, intelligence agencies and control bodies, academic circles, and even think tanks. In the international arena, he has marginalised NATO, the UN system, and other multilateral formats. The administration’s actions are being conducted by a narrow group of loyalists, bypassing analytical apparatuses, allied consultations, and with a complete abandonment of institutionally rooted procedures.
Trump likes to say: “We don’t want other people’s wars. Let them get along with each other.” But this declaration of isolationism is a facade. The US still, more or less directly and openly, engages in conflicts if it sees a chance for profit. What Trump considers ‘interest realism’ is in fact a pursuit of minimising costs and maximising profits. That is why he has no hesitation in abandoning former allies if agreements with them do not bring immediate benefits.
In Qatar, Trump applied similar logic, based on a cool calculation of profits and losses – it was not about building alliances or stabilising the region, but about concluding lucrative investment agreements. About “deals” with the powerful of this world – regardless of their systems and roles in regional conflicts.
The announcements of a new agreement with Iran are also in this spirit: limiting uranium enrichment in exchange for access to some of the frozen funds and lifting selected sanctions. For Israeli experts, such an approach has generally meant “only buying time, not solving the problem.” American analyst Trita Parsi points out demanding that Iran completely abandon its uranium enrichment programme – so-called zero enrichment – is not only unrealistic, but downright harmful. The pushing of this demand by American hawks has so far led to breakdown of negotiations, paradoxically accelerated development of Iranian nuclear programme, and strengthened the aggressive rhetoric of Iranian propaganda.
Although we are talking about the Middle East, it is impossible to ignore the internal conditions co-shaping Washington’s new policy. The American political scene is increasingly divided between supporters of strong isolationism and promoters of the expansion of national interests. Trump finds himself ideally in this dynamic: as a representative of the world of big capital, but at the same time a populist opposing the “Washington swamp”. The Middle East is therefore also becoming a stage for a shadow theater for domestic use: it’s here that Trump can show his voters that he is able to conclude “the best agreements”, with “anyone who respects US and invests in America”, as he said in Dubai.
Billion-dollar and even trillion-dollar transactions, including defence and investment contracts, are evidence of the consistent implementation of the election slogan America First. Additionally, through praise for the region’s leaders and lack of criticism on human rights issues, Trump signals a departure from traditional diplomatic norms in favour of a specific understanding of pragmatism and realpolitik, bordering on cynicism. This has been met with mixed reactions in American politics. While Trump’s supporters see it as evidence of effectiveness and independence, critics have raised concerns about the policy’s moral implications and impact on US’ traditional alliances.
Does the new security architecture in Middle East, built by Trump, have a chance of survival? Opinion is divided. On one hand, there’s optimism — “a transaction is better than war”, that “money is a more effective language than missiles”. On the other – warnings that a transactional understanding of politics means freezing problems, temporarily suspending chaos, which can return at any moment when the balance of power changes.
Trump is not a madman; however, he is a pragmatist who understands politics in terms of market mechanics. The problem is the world doesn’t function like a stock exchange, and Middle East is not a development project in Miami or Manhattan. It’s an area where fragile social, ethnic and religious relations are torn apart not by lack of money, but lack of hope, and their shape is the result of centuries-old processes – including wars and foreign interventions. Trump’s transactions do not restore hope – they only replace it with illusions. These cost him nothing, which does not mean they are free. On the contrary: their price is the growing desperation and sense of injustice among entire nations, local communities, and individuals in the region. — INFA