Saudi Arabia & Pakistan
By Piotr Opalinski
(Expert, Centre for International Relations, Poland)
The Defence Agreement, signed last month by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, is another sign of the erosion of Pax Americana in favour of increasing global multipolarity. It limits the United States’ monopoly on guaranteeing security to the Persian Gulf countries. While maintaining ties with Washington, Riyadh is simultaneously developing alternative security pillars – economic cooperation with China and military cooperation with Pakistan – signalling a readiness for greater strategic autonomy and partner diversification.
The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), formalizes the two countries’ military relations, committing them to mutual defence. Any act of aggression against one of the signatories is to be treated as an attack on the other. The signing of the document is often portrayed as a turning point in relations between Riyadh and Islamabad, but in reality it marks the institutionalization of ties that have been developing for decades. They are based on religious community and converging strategic interests.
The foundations of Pakistan-Saudi Arabia cooperation date back to the 1960s, when the government in Islamabad began supporting the authorities in Riyadh with advice, training, and a military presence. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reciprocated with financial assistance and preferential oil supplies, which was particularly important during periods of political and economic crises in Pakistan. This system of interdependence has allowed this bilateral partnership to weather numerous regional turbulences, giving it durability and an increasingly formalized character.
Traditionally, the relationship has been asymmetrical: Pakistan contributed personnel and military expertise, while Saudi Arabia provided capital and energy resources. However, the SMDA changes this dynamic by introducing joint exercises, training programs, intelligence coordination, and technology transfer. The agreement creates a framework for long-term cooperation in the development of the defence industry, which increases interoperability and strategic autonomy for both sides. For Islamabad, this means an opportunity to modernize its armed forces and integrate command and communication systems. For Riyadh, it offers the opportunity to gradually reduce its dependence on Western suppliers in selected defence segments.
The economic component of the agreement paves the way for joint arms programs, industrial contracts, and investments in military infrastructure. Pakistan gains the opportunity to develop its own defence sector, create jobs, and retain qualified personnel, partially reducing the brain drain. Saudi Arabia, in turn, gains access to Pakistani technical expertise and relatively cheap labour, while simultaneously diversifying its investment portfolio in the security sector.
The effects of the agreement extend beyond the bilateral dimension. The SMDA not only strengthens the military and economic potential of both countries but also changes the security architecture in the Gulf and South Asia. It increases their prestige and signals their strategic ambitions.
Strengthening cooperation with Riyadh strengthens Pakistan’s international position, gaining not only more stable sources of financing but also the prestige derived from serving as the Kingdom’s main military partner, the guardian of Islam’s holiest sites.
For Islamabad, the SMDA is a tool for strengthening its international position, confirming its status as a mid-tier state with exceptional military potential, particularly due to its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan’s inclusion in the Saudi security architecture strengthens its position vis-à-vis regional rivals – primarily India and Iran – and underscores Islamabad’s role in the global debate on nuclear stability.
For Saudi Arabia, the SMDA is a way to build a more independent security ecosystem in the region, a move that is increasingly important in the context of rivalry with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and uncertainty about continued US involvement in the Middle East. It represents a diversification of the security system and a way to reduce dependence on the US, while also reaffirming its ambitions as a leader in the Sunni world.
Israel, the only country in the Middle East with a nuclear arsenal, remains the most powerful player in the region. Its military actions, including operations in Gaza, attacks on Iran, and the September 2025 airstrike on Doha, are increasing uncertainty in the Muslim world and complicating the strategic situation of Iran, which remains Saudi Arabia’s main rival in the competition for dominance in the Persian Gulf.
Islamabad is striving to maintain a balance – strengthening cooperation with Riyadh while avoiding direct confrontation with Tehran due to geographic proximity, the presence of a significant Shiite minority in Pakistan, and the security of border areas.
In this context, the Saudi-Pakistani strategic defence agreement can serve as a mechanism to balance tensions. It combines military and political dimensions, allowing Muslim states to signal their readiness for a coordinated response. At the same time, it strengthens their position against Israel’s destabilizing actions and fits into a broader strategy of regional deterrence.
India consistently interprets every step strengthening Riyadh’s defence ties with Islamabad as a potential challenge to its security, although India’s strategic relations with Saudi Arabia remain on an upward trajectory and have not been hampered by the signing of the agreement. However, it must be noted that Islamabad, which for years has perceived the growing importance of the Saudi-Indian partnership (particularly in the energy, investment, and technology spheres) as a threat to its own position, has gained a strong counterweight to New Delhi through the SMDA.
From China’s perspective, the formalization of the Saudi-Pakistani defence partnership is viewed as a pragmatic move. Beijing, which views Saudi Arabia as a key energy supplier and Pakistan as an important participant in the Belt and Road Initiative (CPEC), sees this arrangement as a mechanism for strengthening stability along critical transportation and energy routes. For China, the SMDA is not an alliance in its military dimension. Beijing is trying to avoid being drawn into regional rivalries, viewing the treaty as a beneficial hedge for its investments rather than as part of its own military strategy.
Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif’s public statement suggesting the possibility of “sharing” nuclear deterrence capabilities with Saudi allies was primarily political in nature and is not reflected in realistic operational plans. Extended deterrence would require new command procedures, a secure chain of custody, and complex legal arrangements, and above all, it would encounter strong international opposition.
Saudi Arabia remains a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaties (NPTs), while Pakistan is not. However, Islamabad is under intense pressure from the US and China to maintain the status quo in terms of the number of nuclear-armed states. As a result, the issue of a Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Saudi Arabia functions more as a strategic perception than a real military option, influencing the calculations of Israel, India, and Iran.
The agreement symbolizes the erosion of American dominance in the Gulf and a shift towards a more multi-layered security system. Just a decade ago, Saudi Arabia relied almost entirely on the American security umbrella. Currently, Riyadh is pursuing a diversification strategy – maintaining ties with Washington while simultaneously strengthening economic cooperation with China and military cooperation with Pakistan. The SMDA serves as a kind of insurance policy: it signals that Riyadh does not intend to bear the costs of a potential reduction in American involvement alone, and that security in the region will henceforth be shaped by a network of partnerships.
From the US’ perspective, Riyadh’s move is viewed with ambivalence. On the one hand, Washington remains the main guarantor of Saudi Arabia’s security, and American military commitments and arms sales maintain a strong influence in the region. On the other hand, the development of alternative relationships – both economic and military – is seen as an attempt to reduce dependence on the US and a signal that Riyadh is ready for greater strategic autonomy.
Experts emphasize that this trend could change the dynamics of US-Saudi relations and increase the need for diplomatic balancing. It also fosters the emergence of a more dispersed, multipolar security architecture in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East. — INFA