[ Suresh Chandra Mohanty ]
India’s role in playing a fine balancing act with respect to its stand on the Ukraine imbroglio both at the UNSC, where it abstained during vote on Ukraine and the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting at Melbourne is indeed laudable and demand of the current geopolitical situation. Despite comments by a wide spectrum of strategic analysts, suggesting that sooner or later India ought to take a stand either in support or against Russia and indicating that its diplomatic space is shrinking, India has perfectly balanced itself not only in keeping with its traditional, independent and established foreign policy consistency but is also in synergy with its future challenges and supreme national interests. As is evident from the S-400 deal with Russia against THAAD of the US despite repeated threat of CAATSA sanctions, India has steadfastly retained its independence over strategic choices.
Indo-Russia relations
During his short visit to India in December 2021, President Putin had reaffirmed the special and privileged strategic partnership between the two countries and it being the anchor of global peace and stability. Defence cooperation is an important pillar of the India-Russia strategic partnership. Despite the push for self-reliance, India continues to depend on Russia for close to 60 percent of its defence imports, which will continue over the next decade as is evident from the 10-year defence cooperation pact signed in December 2021. This includes indigenous production of T-90 tanks, Su30MKI aircrafts, supply of MIG-29K and upgrading of MIG 29, a range of helicopters, besides the S-400 surface to air missile system, joint production of over 6,00,000 AK 203 assault rifles and the logistic requirement of in-service equipment. Cooperation in joint design and development of fifth-generation fighter and multi-role transport aircraft is also on the anvil. If India has to export the Brahmos missiles to the Philippines and in future to Vietnam and Indonesia, who are also strong contenders, it ought to have Russia on board. Though defence cooperation with the US has substantially increased over the last decade, unlike the US, Russia does not hesitate in sharing niche defence technology with India. Leasing the first nuclear-powered attack submarine, INS Chakra, to India in 1988 and the $ 3 billion deal in 2019 for the Akula class nuclear powered attack submarine to be delivered in 2025, is a manifestation of the trust and depth of mutual cooperation that exists between the two countries. The US, however, has been tentative in sharing critical technology despite the four key defence agreements of general security of military information agreement (GSOMIA) 2002, logistics exchange memorandum of agreement (LEMoA) of 2016, communication compatibility and security agreement (COMCASA) of 2018 and basic exchange and cooperation agreement (BECA) of October 2020. There is no gainsaying that if India has to contest the Chinese in the long term, which appears inevitable consequent to the June 2020 clashes, it ought to have Russia on its side both in terms of continued supply of defence equipment and diplomatic heft. It may be recalled that it was the government controlled Russian TASS News Agency that was one of the first to have reported 45 Chinese casualties in the Galwan clash.
Russia-China
The increasing Russia-China bonhomie and the recent summit meeting on the sideline of the Winter Olympics in Beijing can at best be termed as opportunistic and contingency-based strategic convergence. The two countries, who were allies in the ’50s, fought a border war in 1969 and are partners again in the 2020s. It has apparently more to do with ‘An enemy’s enemy is a friend’ scenario, with the US being the key adversary of both, rather than a relationship that can be termed as seeped in history, culture and tradition. There are fundamental contradictions in the new united front. It is a Russian compulsion to play second fiddle to the Chinese in Asia Pacific, owing to the Chinese economic power. Hence, the meeting in Beijing and the proclamation “friendship between the two has no limits, there are no forbidden areas of cooperation” may be a strategic compulsion for both Russia and China. While Russia is wary of the NATO expansion eastwards, which has grown from 12 countries in 1949 to 30 countries, involving gradual poaching of the erstwhile WARSAW pact members and consequent shrinking of the Russian area of influence, China is wary of the AUKUS, the upgraded Quad and the US Indo-Pacific strategy getting more teeth that threatens its South China Sea aspirations. China will probably leave no stone unturned to provoke the Russians in Eastern Europe, since it would eventually weaken the West’s appetite in the Indo-Pacific and more specifically Taiwan.
As per a news article published in China, the country is sure to fight six wars in the coming 50 years as a part of great rejuvenation, commencing from unification of Taiwan 2020-25 to taking back of lands lost to Russia in 2055-60 timelines. Further, Chinese aspiration in the Arctic despite not being a near Article state, published in its white paper in 2018, would have certainly riled the Russians who claim undisputed supremacy in the Arctic circle.
US primacy
In the words of former secretary of defence James Mattis, the primary of US military and diplomatic power is over, dead and buried, except in the minds of some political leaders. He reiterates that “every domain is contested – air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. In the last two decades, the US has been forced to retreat from a strategy based on primacy and dominance to one of deterrence.” The Chinese have vastly improved the reach of their weapons, have the largest navy, comprising over 350 vessels and growing, hypersonic weapons, and capability to displace satellites from the designated orbit as demonstrated in January 2022. It has embarked on a bid to upgrade and modernize its nuclear arsenal as observed from three new missile silos in north central China.
Even in the current Ukraine crisis, the US and other NATO members, especially Germany and France, may not exactly share similar views. While the US claimed scuttling of the Nod Stream 2 oil pipeline between Russia and Germany if Russia invaded Ukraine, it was neither endorsed by Germany nor by the NATO fraternity, given the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas.
In its multi-front engagement, the US also needs Chinese support to rein in North Korea and Iran. The hurried and unplanned withdrawal from Afghanistan in the face of a UN designated terrorist organization is too fresh in our minds to put all our eggs in the basket of the US as a strategic partner. It may be recalled that the US was consistently nudging India to place its boots on ground in Afghanistan to fight its war against terror. Thankfully, India did not play ball.
Antagonizing Russia in the Ukraine imbroglio would be detrimental to India’s security interests closer home along the LAC and in the Indo-Pacific
region. While maintaining a robust response mechanism against Chinese expansionism in the north, India has decidedly not tried to exploit the other Chinese fault lines of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, including the successor of the Dalai Lama, which it will choose to exploit when push comes to shove and not follow Western dictates that have little understanding of sub-continental realities. India should continue to exercise its sovereign right in maintaining strategic autonomy in foreign policy articulation, in keeping with its long-term national interests, rather than jumping into one bandwagon or the other. (Maj Gen Suresh Chandra Mohanty is advisor to the government of Arunachal Pradesh.)
