Indian diplomacy at an inflection point

[Suresh Mohanty]

The recent attribution of an Indian government agent to the botched up attempt on American citizen Gurpatwant Singh Pannu (a declared terrorist on grounds of sedition and secessionism in India), close on the heels of Canadian assertion of ‘credible allegation’ of an Indian agency involvement in killing of Nijjar (another terrorist affiliated with Khalistan Tiger Force) has tested the resilience of Indian diplomacy. While the Canadian allegation was refuted as absurd and motivated and followed up with expulsion of 41 diplomats, the American allegation has extracted an investigation. Questions are being asked with respect to the dichotomy in the two actions. The government of India has clarified that, while the American allegation pertained to nexus between organised criminals, gun runners and terrorists that constituted national security concerns, the Canadian allegation is bereft of actionable evidence, besides its ruling dispensation displaying permissiveness towards separatist activities against India. Match this with India’s stand on the Israel-Hamas war. While initially unequivocally supporting Israel in its war against terror and abstaining in UN resolution in October calling for humanitarian ceasefire, there has been a reset in supporting the General Assembly resolution call for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire on 12 December. As the race to reach a 5 trillion economy and as leader of the Global South continues in the midst of a dynamic global security landscape, there would be growing and intense scrutiny of India’s diplomatic perspective.

India’s policy compulsions

Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, India has displayed steadfast and robust foreign policy articulation against sustained western pressure. From abstention in the UN against condemnation of Russian aggression of Ukraine and import of discounted Russian oil ignoring international sanctions, to countering US pushback on human rights and freedom of speech, India has maintained its autonomy in foreign policy enunciation, drawing praise even from arch rival Pakistan. Russian President Putin went on to say that he cannot imagine that Modi could be frightened, intimidated or forced to take decisions that would be at variance with the national interests of India. From the successful conduct of G20 summit in the backdrop of widely polarised position on Russia-Ukraine conflict, leading the Global South against an unequal representation at the UN agencies, COP28 meet in UAE, economic upswing backed up by foreign investments, digital public infrastructure and landing of moon on the hitherto fore unexplored South Pole have sought to accelerate India’s global standing and ambitions. However, none of these could be without its share of contestations.

The situation along the LAC, declining Russian economic and military prowess, besides its seeming irreversible enmesh into Chinese strategic embrace Chinese expansionist agenda in the South China Sea and declining US influence, most discerningly in the Middle East, have all necessitated a fundamental review of India’s foreign policy appraisal.

Shedding years of hesitancy and disagreements around technology denial regimes, human right abuses, unilateral sanctions and religious freedom, the current trajectory in Indo-US strategic convergence in multiple domains of critical technologies, defence cooperation and information sharing has strategic advantages for both against a common threat. The recent Pannu-Nijjar episode may be a temporary setback and is unlikely to affect the long-term policy framework as subsequent events of 2+2 dialogue and US financing of west container port terminal in Colombo being developed by Adani investment in Colombo would indicate (notwithstanding Hindenburg report). To draw parallels between similar instant diplomatic irritations with Canada would be unrealistic.

The deepening symbiotic relationships with the UAE and Saudi Arabia based on trust, mutual respect and growth on one hand and Israel based on technology and military cooperation on the other have also been on the upswing a la I2U2 and India Middle East Europe economic corridor. It would be a setback to these developments should India fail to appreciate the sentiments of the Arab world amidst relentless bombing of Gaza by Israel resulting in excessive civilian casualties, including children. The turnaround in India’s stand at the UN on 12 December must be seen in this light. India’s policy in the current crisis in the Middle East has to draw a balance between reinvigorated terrorism (some have apprehensions of a Hamas type attack in India) and two-state solution to the Palestine-Israel problem, currently an anathema to Israel.

How long India will be able to balance and calibrate its nuanced foreign policy in the widely differing and often contesting diplomatic engagement in a polarised geo-strategic environment is a matter of intense debate. With the rapidly changing security situation in the immediate and extended neighbourhood to include border issues and Indo-Pacific as also dependence on the US for technology, trade and military hardware, India cannot afford to antagonise the West (read US and EU), steady its relations with the Middle East and at the same time prevent Russia from falling irreversibly into the Chinese orbit. It is a different matter that the West cannot afford to abandon India given the Russia-China axis in multiple international fora. The discernible decline of the US and the rest of the West, both in military and economic heft, makes this proposition even more complex.

Prognosis

How India must address this perceived conflicting but transactional and contextual foreign policy architecture aligned to its national interest, while managing its relationships around the world of aggressive diplomacy, has invariably to be complimented by matching military and economic power. India is still a long way from achieving this complimenting power matrix. While transformation of military power and economic growth are a work in progress, especially with thrust on ‘Make in India’, in the interim, India will have to depend on suave diplomacy, dialogue and multi-domain alignments with countries having similar strategic interests, without compromising its core national interests. Indian foreign policy should not be marred by domestic political differences. Take the example of Israel, where the war against Hamas triggered the formulation of a war cabinet to combat a common enemy. India as a nation must rally together against a common external challenge through consensus and long-term national interests.

Internal challenges of inequality, economic disparity, diverse socio-cultural and caste alignments must be addressed by statesmanship rather than siding with inimical elements of the state. Internal faultlines should not be allowed to be exploited by inimical foreign powers. Short-term political gains must not compromise national interests.

It is imperative for India to stand united, resolute and steadfast to confront multi-domain challenges to its nationhood in a rapidly evolving world order with severely polarised multilateral institutions. As they say, there are no permanent friends or enemies but permanent national values and interests. (The contributor is former security adviser to GoAP)