[Suresh Chandra Mohanty]
The management of the Indo-Myanmar border (IMB) has, most deservedly, in recent times hit national headlines and assumed enormous strategic significance for three main factors – one, the ongoing internal conflict in Myanmar triggering large-scale infiltration (or read migration) into Manipur and Mizoram; two (and interrelatedly), internal strife in Manipur has precipitated sporadic and targeted attacks in the border areas of the state; and three, Chinese attempts to perpetuate unrest in India’s Northeast as a policy of indirect approach in response to the disturbed situation along the line of actual control (LAC).
During his visit to Delhi on 4 January this year and meeting with the prime minister, the home minister, and the external affairs minister, the newly elected Chief Minister of Mizoram, Lalduhoma, mentioned that any move to fence the 510-kilometre-long porous border the state shares with Myanmar is unacceptable as it is a border enforced by the British to divide ethnic Mizos. This is shortly after the union government decided to scrap the free movement regime (FMR), in vogue since 2018, as part of the Act East policy, followed by fencing the entire border.
The move has been triggered by security concerns and disturbing of the delicate demographic composition of the border states. In fact, the border movement regime has been in existence since the colonial times due to the close cultural, ethnic and traditional relationship amongst the border population. The border was delimited in 1967, largely following the alignment along Patkai Hills (12,552 feet). The FMR was only a formalisation of this practice.
Home Minister Amit Shah reiterated the government’s resolve to fence the Indo-Myanmar border on the lines of the Indo- Bangladesh border and scrap the FMR during his visit to Assam on 20 January this year, drawing strong objection from the apex students’ body of Mizoram, the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP). Meanwhile, the NSCM (IM), an insurgent group in ceasefire with the government since 1997, has said that it would never allow the Centre to fence the border with Myanmar as it would further divide the Naga family “as a nation.”
Following the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, over 40,000 refugees have taken shelter in Mizoram. The recent spike in the clashes between the three brotherhood alliance (comprising the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the T’ang National Liberation Army) and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) has only intensified the movement of refugees, including soldiers of Tatmadaw, into India. The increasing number of attacks on Manipur state security forces of late and the personnel belonging to the Meitei community has instigated the radical and armed Meitei group, Arambai Tenggol, to summon all MLAs and MPs belonging to the community to sign a set of 10 demands to the central government, including delisting of Kukis from the scheduled tribes and replacement of Assam Rifles from the state. This has been termed anarchy by the rival Manipur Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum (ITLF), a Kuki group.
The student and youth organisations in the northeastern states wield considerable power and influence over ethnically aligned people and governance. While Mizoram and Nagaland have strongly opposed to the central government’s plan to scrap the FMR and fence the border, Manipur not only supports it but has intensified its demand to fence the border. The central government ought to harmonise the sentiments of all ethnic communities in view of the sensitivity of the region.
The dynamics of the Indo-Myanmar border varies from state to state, and has long-term security and foreign policy ramifications for India. The 1,643-kilometre-long border involves the states of Arunachal Pradesh (520 kms), Nagaland (215 kms), Manipur (398 kms) and Mizoram (510 kms).
The border is manned by the Assam Rifles along its entire front, while also being responsible for counter-insurgency operations in the hinterland. Unlike other border guarding forces which operate in border outposts (BOP) all along the border, the Assam Rifles operates in Company Operating Bases (COB) with somewhat interchangeability of roles of border guarding and CI operations. It happens to be the only border guarding force operationally under the Indian Army but is funded and equipped by the home affairs ministry, in line with other border guarding forces (BSF, SSB and ITBP).
With about 46 battalions of the Assam Rifles, around 20 are deployed for border guarding, and the balance on counter-insurgency operations. The border was thus far being governed by the FMR to facilitate border trade and due to ethnic similarities of population on either side of the border. This allows population residing close to the border to move up to a distance of 16 kilometres on either side with head loads and permitted to stay up to two weeks with border passes only, valid for a period of one year without the requirement of a visa. The move is controlled over three border crossings – Pangsau in Arunachal, Moreh in Manipur, and Zokhawthar in Mizoram.
Due to the open nature of the border, characterised by rugged and deep forests, lack of infrastructure, inaccessibility and limited surveillance capability, it has seldom been possible to exercise full and effective control over illegal border crossings. Transborder move of insurgents, arms and narcotics takes place often in connivance with the population residing close to the border for petty renumerations, or for fear of reprisal.
In Arunachal, the border is shared by the three southern districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longing (TCL region) affected by insurgency and under the AFSPA for long. Though there are no insurgent camps and resident insurgents in Arunachal, the festering insurgency is supported from the across the border. Of late, even the Naga community (Wancho, Tutsa, and Tangsa) in the TCL region have dissociated themselves from the Nagas of Nagaland and are demanding an autonomous council.
The ceasefire between the government of India with a plethora of insurgent groups is not applicable in Arunachal. There have been intermittent attacks on security forces posts launched from across the border, often in connivance with or in total disdain, by the Myanmar Army. Most insurgent camps across Arunachal border belong to the NSCN (IM) and its various offshoots, as also the ULFA. ULFA insurgents operating largely in restive Upper Assam (now in lowest ebb consequent to large-scale surrender and recently signed accord in December 2023) find the infiltration through Changlang district to be the shortest and least contested due to low density of SF deployment and the Namdapha reserve forest.
In Nagaland, ever since the ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (IM) in 1997, there are designated insurgent camps within which the insurgents groups are relatively free to operate. The terms of the ceasefire agreement restricts combat operations including along the borders. The ethnic Naga population with spillover into Arunachal, Manipur, Assam and even Myanmar (the longstanding demand of greater Nagalim) furiously oppose the border fencing that will not only divide the ethnic Nagas on either side of the IMB but will also restrict their area of influence.
The central government having frozen the terms of the Naga Peace Accord on 31 October, 2019, the agreement continues to be in a limbo due to the demand for a separate flag and a constitution by NSCN (IM). At this stage, any attempt to fence the border will be fiercely opposed by the Nagas.
Manipur, which shares a border of 398 kms with Myanmar, has a number of designated insurgent camps consequent to a similar ceasefire agreement based on suspension of o perations (SoO), that is now being opposed by the Meitei group) and ‘taken note of’ (TNO) camps belonging to disparate insurgent groups. Commencing with the Manorama Devi episode, a large number of police station areas in Imphal have been removed from the AFSPA, permitting insurgents to operate with impunity in the Imphal valley.
There have been number of attacks on security forces personnel launched from camps across the border, including the attack on Colonel Viplav and his family in November 2021. In the past, in response to an attack on the convoy of the 6 Dogra in 2015, which resulted in the death of 18 personnel, a transborder operation against insurgent camps was launched by the Indian Army, in coordination with the Myanmar Army. This was followed by the ‘Sunrise’ series of joint operations in 2019-’20, which met with limited success.
The opposition by Mizoram is largely a byproduct of ethnic affiliation with population close to the IMB in Myanmar. The situation has become more intense after the military takeover in Myanmar in February 2021 and large-scale refugee influx into India. Though Mizoram is not affected by insurgency, it serves as a corridor for drugs and narcotics.
Notwithstanding the central government’s resolve to fence the IMB, execution will most certainly be a challenge. It is not merely the fencing which needs to be foolproof, it also needs to have all weather access to the fence and keeping it under observation and fire to be an effective deterrent. This will require huge investment in construction, lighting, surveillance and physical deployment of troops. Smart fencing, using technology, is a way forward.
Some analysts have suggested takeover of the border by the BSF. It is important to point out that the IMB is least like India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders. The discernible reduction in insurgency in the Northeast has been a result of painstaking effort by the Assam Rifles over decades. It continues to have domain knowledge and expertise in a sensitive region – the reason why it calls itself the friends of the hill people. Short-sightedness should not lead to undoing this enormous advantage. It does not take much time for the region to slide back into alienation and insurgency if we don’t consolidate our hard-earned gains. How the government of India plans to execute this process remains to be seen. (Mohanty is a major general and former security adviser to the Govt of Arunachal Pradesh)
