[ S.Umpo ]
The purpose of this article is not to play a ideological shifting piece, but as a member of legal fraternity, it only endeavours to show the implications of the Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act 1978 from a legal perspective.
Role of state in religious affairs
The principle of secularism emphasizes for the spirit of plurality of the society. It imputes an understanding that the state shall have no religion of its own. That, the state is to regulate the relation of a man with the other man of the society, and not the relationship between a man and his god. The state therefore ought not to be affiliated to any particular religious belief nor should it be pro or anti god.
So then, the important question that needs to be addressed is, does impartiality or neutrality mean state ought to be brain-dead to all religious affairs; the answer would be- No. A society guided by rule of law cannot be subservient to the whims of religious practices which are not fundamentally beneficial to society as a whole. Hence, the states non-discriminatory practices do not mean pea-sized brain of the state in religious affairs.
Constitution on religious freedom
The Constitution, to which every law is under command, envisages that there shall be freedom of religion. Religious freedom guarantees that a person is entitled to freedom of conscience i.e., sense of what is right or wrong for himself and right therefore of (i) professing or to confess to one’s own faith or allegiance; (ii) to practice the tenets or principles of his religious belief; and (iii) to propagate or spread the teachings of his religion.
Nonetheless, in practice of such rights, the public order, morality, health and fundamental rights of the other persons cannot be jeopardised. In such matters the state has played a vital role: The state denied the processions wherein dangerous weapons were being carried out in religious affairs; Excommunication or declaring someone from the society to be outcaste was banned by the state; the demand of hereditary priesthood by brahmins was overcome through legislations carried out by the state. In conclusion therefore, the state plays a predominant role in religious affairs when rituals and practices are not in accordance with the Constitutional mandate. Now the question begets therefore, whether the state can pass rules in relation to APFRA (Arunachal Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act 1978) Act without violating the principles of secularism?
Contentious conversion
The Act provides that no force, inducement or fraudulent means shall be made in order to convert or to attempt to convert from one faith to another. Use of expressions force, inducement or fraudulent cannot be faulted, for the similar to slightly
 varying expressions has been used by Supreme Court in Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors while holding the opinion that the right to propagate does not mean right to convert through any means. To convert a person through any means would dislodge the right to conscience of such convert. Right to propagate only sanctifies the right to preach the tenets of one’s religion and not right to convert through any means.
Mathematical nicety to the expression force, inducement and fraudulent cannot be provided. Therefore, what occasions such fraud and the likes can only be weighed from the perspective of a reasonable man. Would a man of reasonable prudence construe a fact to be offending act; is the question that shall require to be asked before any such prosecution. But the fear of misuse of power always lurks around. And therefore, in order to protect from fallacious prosecutions, a safeguard has been provided in form of want for prior sanction from the office of authority not below the rank of Extra Assistant Commissioner. Further, investigation to the alleged offence can only be carried out by an officer of not below the rank of Inspector of Police. So far, the provisions do not pose a great challenge.
Contentious Provision
The only provision that confronts at the first glimpse is of intimation related. The Act states that any person who converts another through the way of ceremonial ritual or through facilitating such ritual, shall be duty bound to intimate the office of the deputy commissioner of the district about such conversion.
Now, two major consequences follows. Firstly, the person who converted such other, along with its institution, is always skeptical about the authority ill treating him for such conversion, which may be fructified either individually or as an institution. Secondly, the person who converted to such other religion also is fearful of the consequences which shall flow out of his free will to convert, which is his inviolable private right. Combining the above two consequences into one form reincarnates as: skepticism against state’s abuse of power.
Legality and freedom twined
The motive of the present Act is consistent with the mandate of the Constitution. Nonetheless, motive however good does not suffice and cannot escape the scrutiny of judicial review unless the provisions are also in accord with Constitutional norms. It’s too early to rule out the legality of the provisions when the rules are yet to be notified and enforced.
In the meantime, it has to be seen as to upon whom the initial burden of proof is arrayed for. As a rule of prudence, the initial burden of proof ought to be upon such person alleging the offence; meaning the state. Shifting such burden upon the informant would only grow the skepticism by volumes.
Then again, it should also be acknowledged that the conversion not only happens through the threshold of prayer halls, but also through educational institutions, through recreation of myths, via screens and so on so forth. But at the end of the day, religion is a place of solace. A string that binds people together. To him prayers are offered in times of heaven and woe. That omnipotent deity who seeks peace and harmony ought not to libeled in battles of ideology. (Umpo is an assistant professor at Jarbom Gamlin Government Law College, Jote)