[ Gyatso Lepcha ]
In light of the unprecedented tragedy which has struck the Teesta valley, the Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) would like to offer our prayers for all affected beings, our land and the Teesta river. Our sincere condolences to the families of those who have lost near and dear ones, and our solidarity with all who are searching for their missing families and dealing with the loss of lives and properties in the aftermath of this tragedy in Sikkim and North Bengal.
Currently, the focus naturally has to be first on rescue and relief, as well as the restoration of communication infrastructure, which has been destroyed in the flood.
The washing away of the dam of the 1,200 MW Teesta-III project after the glacial lake
outburst flood (GLOF) is one of the very significant developments in this tragedy. While postmortems will follow, we would like to place some facts on record here.
The ACT had raised various concerns about this project since its inception stage, but in this note we will restrict ourselves to providing some facts, specifically on concerns raised upfront regarding poor environmental risk assessment in general and specifically on GLOFs. We will also share information related to GLOFs which was already being discussed as part of the Teesta basin carrying capacity study, but which failed to find a place in the EIA studies of the 1,200 MW Teesta-III project, and a few developments which took place during the construction of the project, which are relevant to the current situation as well as the future of the Teesta.
In the aftermath of a disaster of this magnitude, it is important that we place these facts on record. As time passes, it is very likely that all of us will slip back into our collective amnesia and choose to not see the reality the way it really is.
1) Carrying capacity study of the Teesta basin and meetings of the steering committee held on 25 April, 2005 (over a year before the 1,200 MW Teesta-III was granted environmental clearance on 4 August, 2006 by the ministry of environment, forests & climate change (MoEFCC).
The risks due to GLOFs were discussed well before the environmental clearance was granted to the 1,200 MW Teesta-III project and work began on the project.
The 510 MW Teesta Stage-V hydroelectric project, located downstream, was granted environmental clearance in May 1999 on the condition of conducting a Teesta river basin carrying capacity study, and it was specifically stipulated that “No other project in Sikkim will be considered for environmental clearance till the carrying capacity study is completed.”
Although the final study was completed only in 2007, the MoEFCC relied on interim reports to consider several projects for environmental clearance prior to the completion of the study. Not just the final report, but interim reports and minutes of the Steering Committee for Carrying Capacity Study of Teesta Basin have recorded clearly the risks due to GLOFs. For example, the third meeting of the steering committee was held in New Delhi on 25 April, 2005. The meeting was attended by MoEFCC officials, Sikkim government officials and scientists and personnel from various institutes, including the Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies for Mountain and Hill Environment (CISMHE) – University of Delhi; IIT Delhi; WAPCOS; Salim Ali Centre for Ornithology & Natural History; North Bengal University; Sikkim Government College; and NBSS, Kolkata.
The minutes of the meeting record: “All investigators observed that north Sikkim is geologically, seismically and biologically extremely sensitive and fragile. Any proposed development activity in this region would have adverse impacts and would cause damage to the nascent ecosystems, alpine meadows and forested slopes as well as some critically endangered flora and fauna inhabiting these ecosystems. The glacial moraines, temporarily forming glacial lakes and debris cones are potential hazards in north Sikkim.”
WAPCOS Ltd was part of these ‘all investigators’ which acknowledged the threat of GLOFs in the meeting of the steering committee for the Teesta basin carrying capacity study. However, it deliberately or otherwise chose not to assess the risk of GLOFs at all in the EIA report it was parallelly working on specifically for the 1,200 MW Teesta-III project. Nor did the MoEFCC insist on such a study being done.
2) Public hearing held on 8 June, 2006 for 1,200 MW Teesta-III hydroelectric project and its aftermath:
Members of the ACT were present in the public hearing held as part of the environmental clearance process and made both oral and written submissions on a large number of issues. The proceedings of the public hearing record the submission by Pemzang Tenzing from Mangan, north Sikkim, although the State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) has very briefly summarised the submissions and responses of the company. Tenzing clearly raised the larger issue of poor environmental risk assessment in general and more specifically glacial studies and floods. The company response to his submission was recorded vaguely as: “Most of the aspects have been comprehensively covered. However, necessary rectification wherever required shall be taken up both in the EIA & EMP.”
However, no rectification was done in the EIA & EMP to look at glacial studies and floods, in particular the risks due to GLOFs.
Although the concerns on GLOFs and response of the company were recorded briefly in the public hearing proceedings, the company (then called Teesta Urja Ltd) responded in slightly more detail to the MoEFCC after the public hearing. In a letter dated 3 July, 2006, the company clarified some issues with respect to the submissions made by then ACT members Tseten Lepcha and Pemzang Tenzing. With respect to one of the observations of Pemzang Tenzing, the company said that “sufficient mitigation measures have been proposed and covered as part of EMP to take care of any eventual flood. Regarding the increased sedimentation, catchment area treatment measures have been suggested to control the sedimentation in consultation with the forest department. The spillway for the project has been designed to handle probable maximum flood of 7,000 cumec, which is taken on a highly conservative side. To prevent any natural disaster, sufficient mitigation measures have been proposed as part of disaster management plan.”
This clarification was totally misleading and a lie in response to a query on GLOFs.
The spillways were designed to handle only the probable maximum flood due to rainfall events and were not designed to handle a GLOF event like the one which occurred. This was the case despite GLOFs already being a part of discussions of the Teesta basin carrying capacity study. As pointed out, it was also specifically raised during public consultations on the Teesta-III project in June 2006. Some news reports have quoted Sikkim Urja (the current name of the Sikkim government company running the Teesta-III project) officials as saying they tried opening the spillway gates but could not.
Irrespective of the factual accuracy of this statement, the spillway was simply not designed to carry the flows from a GLOF event such as that which occurred.
The company, the Sikkim government, the MoEFCC, the Central Water Commission (CWC) and the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) simply set us up for this disaster by allowing a spillway design which simply cannot handle GLOF events of this nature, even though this was discussed as a known threat in the steering committee meetings of the Teesta basin carrying capacity study.
3) The ACT’s challenge of the environmental clearance granted to the 1,200 MW Teesta-III project in August 2006 before the erstwhile National Environmental Appellate Authority (NEAA): Serious concern raised about lack of environmental risk assessment, including due to GLOFs.
The ACT challenged the August 2006 environmental clearance to the Teesta-III project before the NEAA. In this note, we would like to only reproduce two paragraphs from our petition, which were part of highlighting the poor EIA studies: “18 (E),” that there is no environmental risk assessment included in the EIA report. The project area lies in the eastern Himalayas, which is prone to several environmental risks which can not only pose risks to people but also affect the long-term viability of the project, including considerable economic implications. These risks include flashfloods, climate change related risks including glacial recession and GLOFs, increased run-off, and sedimentation. The dam break analysis and disaster management plan have also not been included in the documents made available.
A detailed study of the environmental risks and their economic implications before granting clearance to the project is extremely important, particularly for the government of Sikkim, which is going ahead with these projects to gain economic benefits for the state at a great ecological and social cost to its people. “8 (G),” that all the rainfall in the entire catchment is drained through the Teesta river. The area is also susceptible to cloud bursts. The monsoon in the region is vigorous and resulting in a minimum of 1,700-1,800 cumecs. It can go up to 15,000-20,000 cumecs during floods. During the 1968 floods, which damaged the 80 ft high Anderson bridge, a record of 15,000+ cumecs was recorded, says Dr Jeta Sankritayana of North Bengal University. Some scientists suspect that GLOFs may have been the cause of these floods. The presence of a hydrological installation in such a river can pose serious danger to downstream areas and the current risk assessment procedures are absent or inadequate. It is not enough to later say that a ‘natural disaster’ hit the project. Comprehensive risk assessment needs to be done at the planning stage and made public, so that the locals of the area shall know the impact of the project.”
In the counter-affidavits by the MoEFCC and the company, not a single line was written about the threat of GLOFs we had raised. The NEAA dismissed our appeal. Not a single line was written about the threat of GLOFs we had raised in the NEAA order of July 2007.
By the time the order came, the marathon Sikkim dam satyagraha had already begun in June 2007. The ACT chose to focus its energies on the local movement and try and save other stretches of the Teesta and its tributaries, even as our concerns raised about the 1,200 MW Teesta-III fell on deaf years.
4) Company tries to reduce spillway capacity further during construction phase. While the 1,200 MW Teesta-III project went ahead with a compromised spillway capacity which led to the current situation of the dam getting washed away after a GLOF, the situation could have been worse if the dam company had its way. During the construction of the project in 2008-’09, the dam company unilaterally changed the design of the project, which would have reduced the already compromised spillway capacity to carry floods from 7,000 cumecs to 3,000 cumecs. The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) raised serious concern. The matter was also discussed by the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) on the river valley projects of the MoEFCC in its meeting held in Sikkim in April 2009. Relevant extracts of the minutes are reproduced below:
“The EAC observed that the chief engineer (HPM), CEA after the site inspection by the member (hydro), CEA on 5 December, 2008 communicated the following observations to the project authorities,
“During the visit, the following major changes in construction features were broadly observed from those concurred/approved by CEA. The changes are likely to affect the working of the project even may endangering the safety of the dam.
“Concrete face rock fill dam (CFRD)/ concrete dam with chute spillway was concurred. Provision of breast wall type of spillway with 4 radial gates of 6m x 10.25 m each and an auxiliary spillway utilising diversion tunnel for flood routing was approved in the concurrence letter issued by CEA for handling a flood discharge of 7,000m3. The spillway has now been completely deleted and floodwater is proposed to be routed through 2 numbers of spillway tunnels, including the diversion tunnel. These two spillway tunnels may be able to handle a flood discharge of about 3,000 m3 as against 7,000m3 provided by the project authorities earlier. Being CFRD type of dam construction, flood discharge higher than 3,000m3 cumec is likely to overtop the dam endangering its safety/washing away of dam.
“Provision of three chambers each oval shaped 250m long with 16m width and 18m height was cleared for construction as per the concurrence letter. These have now been replaced by 2 numbers of desilting chambers each about 300m long. This may affect the silt removal efficiency and thus affect the operating availability of the machines.
“The committee informed the project authority that the project was accorded environmental clearance based on the design parameter given at the time of environmental appraisal of the project. It appears from the report of member (hydro) of CEA that major deviations have been carried out by M/s Teesta Urja Ltd without bringing it to the notice of the EAC/MoEF.
“The committee observed that a major matter of concern is adoption of a concrete face rock fill dam (CFRD) with diversion tunnels (DT) modified to function as spillway. The altered arrangement of adopting the DTs which can discharge only 3,000 cumec is definitely an unsafe proposition for this major 1,200 MW power project.
“The committee further observed that a rock fill dam with inadequate spillway capacity faces the risk of overtopping, which leads to dam break: a catastrophic proposition as five major schemes Teesta IV, V, VI and two low dams are planned/ constructed on the river downstream. A categorical comment on this is the observation of member (hydro) during inspection. These two spillway tunnels may be able to handle a flood discharge of about 3,000 m3 as against 7,000 m3 provided by the project authorities earlier. Being CFRD type of dam construction, flood discharge higher than 3,000 m3 cumec is likely to overtop the dam, endangering its safety/washing away of dam.”
The CEA and the CWC did not allow reduction in the spillway capacity which the developers had already begun unilaterally implementing. The reason why we have provided this information here is to show how hydropower development is taking place along the Teesta in reality. To begin with, the developers and central agencies side-stepped concerns about GLOFs raised in the Teesta basin carrying capacity study deliberations (and also by the ACT) to allow a compromised spillway capacity (7,000 cumecs). Once work began, the developers tried to reduce this already compromised capacity by a further 57 per cent to 3,000 cumecs. In this case, the central agencies disallowed this thankfully. But the disaster was still waiting to happen as the existing capacity of 7,000 cumecs was also compromised.
The government of Sikkim compromised crucial aspects of our environmental and social security to push the 1,200 MW Teesta-III in the early days, citing economic reasons. More recently, after the state government had to take over a white elephant (the Teesta III project) after the private developers bungled, the original economic justifications have also been on shaky ground.
Now that the dam has simply been washed away, leading not just to disaster in the downstream, but also tremendous economic loss to our state, we hope some wisdom dawns. It is clearer than ever that compromised environmental security while planning hydropower projects in the Teesta river basin will also lead to compromised economic security in the long-term.
Will there be accountability and liability fixed for negligence in the decision-making and operation phase which led to magnifying the disaster? We can only hope so, though our experience makes us sceptical.
While the ACT stands in solidarity with those affected by the bursting of the dam, it condemns the project authority, the Teesta Urja Limited and the private financiers seeking profits, for ignoring the environment, social concerns and disaster risks potential raised by affected communities and environmentalists.
With staggering cost of the project to the tune of Rs 14,000 crore, the damage inflicted by the bursting of the dam will further burden the government of Sikkim with indebtedness. The government had to borrow more money to repair and rehabilitate for the colossal damage inflicted on the land and the people.
The government of Sikkim should decommission the 1,200 MW Teesta-III dam for its unviability and repeated social and environmental impacts. The plan to build the 520 MW Teesta-IV hydroelectric project and Panam 280 MW should be scrapped for possible adverse impact on land and people. The government of India should review all plans to build large dams in the fragile Himalayas in Sikkim and across Northeast India. And also, the government should stop the blame games for the disaster. I think it’s time to accept the blunder we have made and look towards safe and sustainable Sikkim future. (Courtesy: Sikkim Express. The writer is the general secretary of the Affected Citizens of Teesta.)
